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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether the release of market-relevant news in the form of rumours on 
Twitter can explain the excess of market volatility previously attributed to private information, 
speculation, and noise traders. We define a simple theoretical model to show that the systematic 
information content of such rumours should result in detectable price effects in macro-markets. 
We then pinpoint the arrival of 63 rumours of forthcoming ECB actions over a 420-day sample 
of one-minute spot EUR-USD rates, and show that there is a real-time, intraday increase in 
market volatility. This largely unexplored information set can potentially account for 
significant amounts of unexplained volatility in macro-markets and, therefore, identify a 
possible explanation of one of the most prominent puzzles in price discovery research. 
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1. Introduction 
The excess volatility puzzle is one of the foremost unanswered questions in financial 
economics. The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) has, in all its guises, offered theoretical 
and empirical backing to the notion that security prices vary as a result of new information 
arrival. A large number of studies, however, have shown that such flows of market-relevant 
information cannot fully explain the large volatility observed in financial markets. Many 
scholars have argued that such excess volatility can be explained by the existence of private 
information (see, among others, French and Roll 1989). A competing explanation comes from 
behavioural finance, and it is based on the idea of irrational investors as a solution to the ‘excess 
volatility puzzle’. Within this school of thought, the existence of excess volatility is ascribed 
to the existence of noise, and to technical and speculative investors (see, among others, De 
Long et al. 1990). However, both these competing paradigms struggle to offer tangible 
evidence of the determinants of excess of volatility. ‘Noise’ and private information are, in 
fact, particularly difficult to pinpoint in time, source, scale and scope.  
In this study, we define a tangible alternative source of excess financial market volatility, a part 
of the puzzle previously unaccounted for by economists but discerned by market participants. 
We focus on a new source of systematic informational flow that is relevant to macro-markets. 
The advent of social networks has enabled the identification of ‘market rumours’, although this 
has rarely been the subject of discussion within the price discovery literature. In fact, up until 
the introduction of Twitter and similar financial micro-blogging sources, such rumours, whilst 
known to market participants, were not available as a database to investigators. It is this, largely 
neglected, category of information which is of most interest to this study.1  
More specifically, we pinpoint the source, timing, scale and scope of sixty-three financial 
market rumours relating to upcoming European Central Bank (ECB) policy actions and 
announcements over the period 29 September, 2013 to 08 May, 2015 and gauge their ability to 
explain the observed volatility in the Euro-US dollar market. We assert that such rumours are 
neither private at source nor noise in relevance. We define these market rumours as actionable 
information, broadcast on Twitter, by multiple market commentators. We suggest this is 
information to be considered for trade execution, provided that it leads to a probabilistic change 
                                                          
1 Given the above discussion, the following statement still remains relevant today: ‘If private information is at least in part ruled out, supporters 
of the Efficient Market Hypothesis must concede the existence of fundamental market information detected by market actors but not by 
economists.’ (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998): 
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in market participants’ expectations of future ECB policy decisions, and therefore to a shift in 
market consensus. As long as a large enough number of market participants discern a particular 
rumour as having a high enough probability to occur, then a period of market volatility should 
be observable. 
Our empirical results show that real-time price discovery in the foreign exchange markets are 
associated with the real-time arrival of ECB relevant rumours. More specifically, out of 63 
ECB rumours under scrutiny, 25 exerted a significant and positive impact on foreign exchange 
volatility. The instantaneous increase in volatility during the first minute of rumour arrival was 
up to 211%, whereas the cumulative increase in volatility over a 60-minute window was as 
much as 2614%. This finding provides fundamental evidence that market-relevant rumours – 
conveying a potential change to future expectations of systematic risk factors – carry risk 
premium in macro-markets. 
The findings presented in this study are of interest to academics, practitioners and 
policymakers. For academics, this previously undetected price formation process incrementally 
increases the proportion of excess volatility that can be explained. This is of wider salience 
given that ECB rumours are just one category of undetected rumour arrival. For practitioners, 
the implementation of a rumour trading strategy can yield significant profits. Sentiment-based 
trading algorithms have been successfully implemented (Tetlock 2007). A simple trading 
algorithm, which identifies and executes a directional trade based on fast-diffusing, large-scope 
(actionable) rumours could yield significant excess returns. For policy makers, particularly 
central banks, the monitoring of rumours is imperative given the sensitivity of markets during 
pre-announcement periods and the crucial relationship of investor expectations to desired 
market reaction to policy announcements. Policy makers may wish to correct market agents’ 
interpretations of policy rumours, which if left unchecked may result in potentially disruptive 
volatility events.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature and 
defines the theoretical framework that underpins the rationale for market rumours to be a source 
of information fundamental to the process of price formation in efficient markets. Section 3 
provides details of market and information data. Section 4 sets out the methodology and 
assesses its robustness by means of Monte Carlo simulations. Section 5 discusses the empirical 
results, while Section 6 concludes.  
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2. Rumours and Price Formation: A Paradigm  
The Efficient Market Hypothesis suggests that financial asset prices reflect all information 
relevant to the value of a given traded security. In its strongest form, the EMH dictates that 
relevant information, regardless of whether it is in the public domain, or held privately, will be 
reflected in market price. Given this assertion, asset price fluctuations should reflect the arrival 
of new information about relevant market events that have already occurred or are expected to 
occur in the future. This notion has resulted in a large body of research testing the informational 
efficiency of financial markets. A large number of studies have investigated the market impact 
of the arrival of macroeconomic news. One strand of this literature focuses on the directional 
change in asset prices following news arrival (Cutler et al. 1989, Menkhoff 2010, Berry and 
Howe 1994, Kurov and Stan 2018, and Altavilla et al. 2017). A second strand measures asset 
price volatility following news arrival (Andersen et al. 2000, Andersen and Bollerslev 1997, 
Chang and Taylor 2003, Bauwens et al. 2005, and Li et al. 2015). The latter is of greater 
relevance to this study. 
At lower frequency, daily observations, French and Roll (1986), Barclay et al. (1990) and Ito 
et al. (1998) found that a relatively small amount of daily asset price volatility can be attributed 
to the arrival of new public information. They all conjecture the existence of private 
information among ‘informed market agents’, as the reason behind the remaining unexplained 
asset price volatility. However, any evidence of the existence of such private information is 
ambiguous, as opposed to being pinpointed in time with a given source. 
The availability of higher frequency intraday data has yielded more insightful results. Andersen 
et al. (2000), Cutler et al. (1989), Menkhoff (2010), Andersen and Bollerslev (1997), and 
Chang and Taylor (2003) all found that a larger proportion of price variability can be attributed 
to the arrival of new information. There remains a consensus, however, that volatility 
attributable to the arrival of new public information is low when compared to that of their 
respective samples. Andersen and Bollerslev (1997), in particular, discovered a distinct 
periodic intraday volatility pattern where the magnitude of return variability is consistently 
correlated with variations in market activity. They suggested, in line with French and Roll 
(1986), that the greater variability in returns during periods of heightened market activity is 
evidence of price adjustments due to the existence of private information.2 More recently, 
                                                          
2 Periodic volatility patterns during periods of heightened market activity can also occur as a result of market microstructure factors such as 
systematic periods of increased order flows (Groß-Klußmann and Hautsch 2011).  
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scholars have increasingly focussed on studying the formation of prices prior to the arrival of 
new information. Bauwens et al. (2005), Andersen et al. (2007), and Groß-Klußmann and 
Hautsch (2011) have found heightened levels of volatility in stock, bond and currency markets 
prior to the arrival of new scheduled and unscheduled public information. Bauwens et al. 
(2005), have drawn upon these findings to give further empirical support to the notion that 
private information triggers price adjustments prior to market information becoming public. 
Despite this growing body of research, questions remain over the plausibility of the notion that 
a sizable majority of excess price variation occurs due to private information arrival. After all, 
by its nature, private information is likely to filter relatively slowly into price and not to produce 
large price deviations – as suggested by price discovery authors (see, among others, Anderson 
and Bollerslev 1997 and Bauwens et al. 2005). While it is fair to acknowledge the existence of 
private information and a resultant price formation process, the idea that information known 
by a limited number of individuals is the main – or one of the main determinants – of financial 
market volatility, is not entirely plausible. 
The literature testing the informational efficiency of financial markets has traditionally divided 
new information into four broad categories. The first consists of the arrival of new scheduled 
public information. The second is the arrival of new unscheduled information. Both are 
generally about market events that have occurred in the past.3 The third type consists of 
privately held information, which is assumed to circulate among a small group of ‘in the know’ 
market agents. Information of this type is generally about a market-relevant event due to take 
place in the future or which has already taken place, but of which the public are unaware.4  
The fourth type consists of market rumours. The financial-market impact of this type of 
information has been explored to a lesser extent. This is in part due to the ambiguous nature of 
rumours and difficulty in acquiring timestamped historical datasets of rumour arrival. A 
substantial body of research has investigated the price effect of firm-specific rumours at daily 
frequency by considering takeover stories published in financial newspapers. Empirical results 
suggest that speculative stories of potential M&As published in the financial press result in 
significant changes in the price trends for the acquired firm's equity, during the pre-acquisition 
windows (see, among others, Pound and Zeckhauser 1990, Zivney et al. 1996, Gao and Oler 
                                                          
 
3 The former has a pre-specified arrival time whereas the latter does not. Examples are macroeconomic data released by a 
government body, and the announcement of a profit warning. 
4 An example of private information would be insider knowledge of an upcoming takeover. 
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2012 and Chou et al. 2015, and Ahern and Sosyura 2015). However, the findings presented in 
this literature fail to show the real-time price formation effect of rumours. This is usually due 
to rumour datasets not containing timestamps to a high enough frequency. There is very limited 
research into the systematic influence of rumours on macro-markets. Oberlechner and Hocking 
(2004) have shown – using questionnaire and interview data – that traders implement currency 
market transactions based on informal communications with ‘in the know’ journalists and 
sources. The intuition is that market-relevant rumours carry an informational risk premium. 
Their intuition and survey findings are in line with the empirical results of this paper; however, 
in the absence of an empirical sample of timestamped market-relevant rumours, it is difficult 
to identify any associated real-time price discovery process. 
The advent of social networks has made possible to track and timestamp the release of news 
and comments made by individual users, enabling researchers to investigate much stringent 
hypotheses on the link between rumours and financial markets. From a theoretical perspective 
Kosfeld (2005) builds on Banerjee’s (1993) theoretical model to show that if the diffusion of a 
rumour is wide enough, through word of mouth, then such rumours can cause a significant 
‘price run-up’. The model builds on the assumption that rumours transmit more effectively in 
networks that are small and local rather than large and global. We would argue that this 
theoretical model can be expanded to include a more global outreach for a given rumour since 
the existence of social media outlets has been shown to lead to rapid rumour diffusion (Nekovee 
et al. 2007). From an empirical perspective, there is now a burgeoning strand of studies which 
exploits the possibility to timestamp comments from users on future firm-specific events such 
as earnings announcements, and matches their arrivals with price fluctuations (see, for 
example, Sprenger et al. 2014, Chen et al. 2014, Sul and Dennis 2017).  
In addition, the parallel literature on the systematic influence of rumours on macro-markets is 
in its infancy, and mainly characterised by studies that focus on the detection of sentiment 
indices using social networks data (see, e.g., Renault 2017, and Siganov et al. 2017). We 
contribute to this nascent strand of research by focussing on the macroeconomic information 
content of ECB Twitter rumours and their link with the EUR-USD exchange rate. Our study is 
based on the intuition that the rapid global transmission enabled by networks like Twitter 
combined with the appetite of investors for insights on future policy stances of the ECB can 
create an environment in which systematic risk factors are at play – so that during rumour 
diffusion the market should command risk premia. 
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Rumours by their nature are difficult to pinpoint in time and rational expectations theory would 
suggest rumour information to be of little fundamental importance to the pricing of assets. It is 
therefore understandable that this type of information has remained overlooked in the past. We 
argue, however, that if rumours sufficiently alter the perceptions held by market participants 
of a given future market event, they become fundamental to the pricing mechanism. 
We tackle this issue in the context of the strong form EMH, which asserts that an efficient 
financial market will price all available relevant information, public and private, about market 
events that have already occurred or are expected to occur in the future. Market rumours by 
their nature are information events predominantly indicating the size, scope, timing and 
probability of future market events.  
The arrival of a market rumour could plausibly change the nature of investor forecasts of future 
events. Depending on the timing and quality of the source of a given rumour, market agents 
may reasonably alter the probability they attach to the possible outcomes of a specific future 
event and, as a result, may revise the pricing of assets with the expectation of reaping extra 
profits.  
Figure 1a 
 
 
Figure 1a,b,c provide simple illustrations of price formation mechanisms leading up to a future 
event E in the presence of rumours. Figure 1a illustrates a semi-strong efficient market, where 
market agents react only to public information at the time of event E. The size, scope and 
probability of this event become known only at time tE, and profits generated by the price 
adjustment would only be earned by those reacting immediately. In this case, the occurrence 
of event E can explain the full amount of volatility going on in the market. The price formation 
process illustrated in Figure1a is purely theoretical and not observable in financial markets. 
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A price formation process with increasing investor price forecast accuracy and private 
information diffusion is illustrated in Figure1b. Price variation is observed in this scenario up 
to event E. 
Figure 1b 
 
The timing, size, scope and probability of a future event in a strong-form efficient market is 
partly known and priced by ‘in the know’ market agents. Market agents with the best forecasts 
or private information prior to event E will profit most. In this case, the occurrence of event E 
can account for only a fraction of the total market volatility, with fluctuations prior to event E 
which remain un-explained. This simple illustration does converge to the reality of financial 
market price formation.  
In reality, however, Figure 1c is more representative of pre-event price formation. Price 
formation is a dynamic process where forecasts alter frequently due to continuous market 
information flows.  
Figure 1c 
 
The timing, size, scope and probability of upcoming event E changes based on heterogeneous 
forecasts and beliefs. Cumulative market participant forecasts form a market consensus, which 
at any given time determines price. 
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If the arrival of a rumour R sufficiently changes the forecasts of a large enough group of market 
agents to a new homogenous forecast, then a resultant volatility event may be expected. Given 
that market agents attach a certain probability to the rumour being true, they stand to profit by 
taking action based on the change to their forecasts. The profit may be contemporaneous at 
time tR or based on a time advantage over market agents who react at time tE. With the profit 
motive in mind, it is perfectly rational for market agents to change their position based on the 
probability they attach to the rumour being true. Such a probabilistic calculation is simply a 
risk-weighted trading decision, one that would be deemed rational in an efficient market. In 
this last case, the arrival of rumour R can account for the volatility prior to the arrival of event 
E.  
While we frame our analysis in the context of the EMH, the modality previously described 
through which information arrives into the markets and affects the pricing of securities is also 
consistent with the so-called Policy Anticipation Hypothesis (PAH). The PAH puts forward 
the idea that market reactions to economic news are influenced by the expectations of investors 
who anticipate the response of monetary authorities to such news (see, e.g., Cook and Korn, 
1991). Once we believe that rumours convey valuable information not yet known to the public, 
such rumours become part of the information set available to anticipate the ECB’s policy 
stances, and therefore future movements in the EUR-USD market. 
We provide below a more formal representation of the price formation process incorporating 
the arrivals of both official news and rumours that shows that rumours could, in principle, play 
a significant role in the pricing of securities. 
To demonstrate this, we define It as a vector of all variables determining the exchange rate of 
a given currency pair prior to an event E. The outcome of such an event could alter the 
composition, magnitude and probability attached to any given element of vector It. We would, 
however, expect It to remain fixed between time 0 and tE, without the arrival of unscheduled 
market-relevant information. This vector includes the known quantities of exchange rate 
determinants such as, the rate of inflation, trade balances and interest rate differential, as well 
as information about central bank announcements/actions, which determine investors’ 
expectations about the future values of said variables. Further, we denote 𝐼𝑡 as a vector 
containing the consensus estimates of all market participants of each element of It between time 
0 and tE. Equilibrium foreign exchange rate at any time 𝑡 ∈ [0; 𝑡𝐸] can be written as 𝐹𝑋𝑡 =
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∅(𝐼𝑡, 𝐼𝑡). We can obtain the approximate change in the foreign exchange rate within this time 
window by linearizing ∅ and time differencing the result, so that: 
∆𝐹𝑋𝑡 ≅ ∅1
′ ∆𝐼𝑡 + ∅2
′ ∆𝐼𝑡 
where ∆ is the difference operator between time 0 and 𝑡𝐸, and ∅1
′ =
𝜕∅
𝜕𝐼𝑡
 and ∅2
′ =
𝜕∅
𝜕𝐼𝑡
. With 
the supposition that none of the foreign exchange rate determinants can change during the 
window, thus ∆𝐼 = 0 and ∆𝐹𝑋 = ∅2
′ ∆𝐼𝑡. Any marginal effect on the exchange rate is given by 
an element of the vector ∅2
′ , as a result of a change to a corresponding element of the market 
consensus vector 𝐼. Changes to market consensus without material changes to vector I, 
detectable as excess volatility, can be deemed a repricing of risk by the market, due to either 
undetected information events or noise. We assert that a rumour event R can be seen as an 
undetected information event. Provided that R delivers information about the probability, scale, 
scope or timing of upcoming event E, and that it sufficiently alters market consensus elements 
of vector 𝐼, a marginal effect on the exchange rate should be observable following the arrival 
of the rumour at time tR. The magnitude of such a change should be proportional to ∅2
′ ∆𝐼𝑡 as a 
result of the arrival of R.  
In Section 5.5, we show that this marginal effect is observable in terms of significant periods 
of exchange rate volatility following the arrival of ECB rumour information events.  
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3. Data description 
3.1. Euro-US dollar exchange rate data 
The Euro-US dollar currency market is the largest in the world by number of transactions per 
day. It opens 2200 GMT Sunday and is subject to a 24-hour trading day until 2200 GMT Friday. 
Pre-market (weekend) trading is available through some exchanges; however trading volume 
is relatively illiquid when compared to standard non-weekend trading (Chaboud et al. 2014). 
The market’s opening hours overlap with geographic trading days in Tokyo, Sydney, Frankfurt, 
London and New York; the most active financial centres. This 24-hour trading day allows the 
investigation of price formation during the full weekly information cycle.  
We source EUR-USD exchange rate data from Bloomberg professional services. We have 
chosen to utilise 1-minute interval exchange rate data to accommodate the investigation of 
post-rumour price formation in greater detail. The data supplied consists of exchange rate 
quotes for a period spanning from 29 September, 2013 to 08 May, 2015 (84 weeks, 420 days), 
totalling in 604,800 observations.5 Quote data is available for weekend trading hours (2200 
GMT Friday to 2200 GMT Sunday) however, we choose to omit these observations due to the 
reasons given above. Further, we omit trading half-days and major holidays during which 
trading is considerably less active. These omissions result in a final minute-by-minute data 
sample of 596,160 observations, from a total of 414 trading days, individually made up of 1440 
1-minute intraday returns. We define intraday returns (Rt,n) in terms of trading day t  =  1,2, ... 
414 and minute interval n  =  1,2,…,1440. Where price is defined as Pt,n, minute by minute 
returns are calculated as follows: 
𝑅𝑡,𝑛 = log(𝑃𝑡,𝑛) − log (𝑃𝑡,𝑛−1)  
The collection of daily EUR-USD data is also required for inclusion in the baseline Flexible 
Fourier form regression to account for the highly persistent volatility factor as observed by 
Andersen and Bollerslev (1997). The inferred volatility in daily frequency observations of spot 
EUR-USD rate, as determined by EGARCH estimates, controls for the observable highly 
persistent volatility in exchange rate. A detailed discussion of this procedure will be outlined 
in Section 4. We source this daily data, spanning from 29 September, 2013 to 08 May, 2015 
for a total of 420 observations, via Bloomberg professional services. Daily data (Rt) is then 
                                                          
5 We limit out sample to this period because in September 2015 Bloomberg signed a data agreement allowing it to include more financial 
market-relevant information first broadcast on Twitter. Prior to this, Bloomberg’s inclusion of information found on Twitter was limited to 
official company disclosures broadcast by official company Twitter accounts.  
[1] 
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filtered to omit related observations removed from our intraday sample (898 observations). 
Descriptive statistics for both daily and intraday frequency samples are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for full sample daily and intraday minute-by-minute EUR-USD exchange rate returns. 
 Mean Median St. Dev.  Skew Kurtosis Min Max Observations 
Rt -4.55x10
-4 -1.45 x10-4 0.0052 -0.138 2.84 -0.021 0.024 898 
Rt,n -2.64x10
-7 3.05x10-9 1.43x10-4 0.235 192.47 -0.0088 0.0094 596,160 
 
  
3.2. Intraday patterns of the Euro-USD series 
It is clear from Table 1 that with a skewness of 0.235 and kurtosis of 192.47 the EUR-USD 
minute-by-minute raw returns are not normally distributed across the sample. This is consistent 
with previous studies by Chaboud et al. (2014) and Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), who make 
use of intraday currency 1-minute and 5-minute data respectively. Furthermore, it can be 
Figure 2 
(a) EUR-USD intraday 1-minute average (one trading day) raw returns R.,n. (b) EUR-USD intraday 1-minute 
average (one trading day) absolute returns |R.,n|. 
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observed that when sample returns are averaged for the trading day, there are distinguishable 
increases in return variability during specific times of the trading day. This greater variability 
is somewhat apparent, although centred around zero, for raw returns but is profoundly clear for 
absolute returns. This unique feature of intraday data was initially identified by Andersen and 
Bollerslev (1997a) and has been consistently observed by a number of other scholars (see, e.g., 
Bauwens et al. 2005, and Chaboud et al. 2014). Figure 2 illustrates the average interval raw 
and absolute returns across the trading day. 
Figure 3 
Ten day correlogram for absolute EUR-USD returns | Rt,n |. 
 
 
 
The regular intraday pattern observed for absolute returns suggests persistent spikes in 
volatility at regular times for the trading day across the sample. These spikes in price variability 
coincide with prominent geographical financial centres opening and with their respective 
scheduled public information releases of macroeconomic data and Central Bank news. This 
study defines the trading day as commencing 2200 GMT when the average absolute 1-minute 
returns are low relative to the trading day. There are small periodic increases in absolute returns 
as Asian financial centres begin their respective trading days. There is a notable rise to a higher 
level of 0.011% for the Frankfurt opening, and a further rise to 0.016% for the start of the 
London trading day. There are further spikes in absolute returns at 0900 GMT (660th interval) 
and 1000 GMT (720th interval) which represent regular macroeconomic data releases. The 
most distinctive feature of the daily pattern is that of the 930th trading interval at which point 
absolute returns spike to 0.046%. This represents East Coast US financial centres opening and 
the release of scheduled macroeconomic data such as the US employment report. Further 
distinguishable spikes represent a second scheduled release of macroeconomic data, US stock 
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markets closing, and times during which the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) releases 
information.  
The intraday pattern in absolute returns discussed above has been reported to result in a 
persistent U-shaped autocorrelation effect throughout the sample (see, e.g., Andersen and 
Bollerslev 1998, and Bauwens et al. 2005). We report similar findings in Figure 3, which 
depicts the 10-day correlogram for absolute returns. Standard volatility models, developed by 
design for analysis of lower frequency daily, weekly and monthly data, are not appropriate 
given the persistent autocorrelation in observations (Payne 1996). This is the principal reason 
we offer for selecting the methodology outlined in Section 4.  
3.3. Information event data 
There are two sources of financial market information for this study: Bloomberg professional 
services and Twitter. Information events sourced via the former facilitate the inclusion of times 
during which scheduled and unscheduled public information arrive. For scheduled events, a 
unity value is included as a dummy variable for the event window commencing at the minute 
the information is released via Bloomberg. The inclusion of said event windows allows for the 
testing of the paper’s main hypothesis while controlling for any volatility jumps attributable to 
scheduled public information events. From Bloomberg professional services, we collect 
timestamped data for 20 categories of scheduled public information releases, totalling 429 
events of this type for the period 29 September, 2013 to 08 May, 2015. Further, 250,000 
unscheduled public information arrivals (news headlines) are collected via Bloomberg for the 
same period. The times of such news headlines are cross-referenced with our sample of 
timestamped rumours, controlling for any period during which unscheduled information arrival 
clashes with a rumour event window. 
Details of public information data are provided in Table 2. For the purpose of this study, we 
collate scheduled public information in twenty categories, FOMC rate decisions, ECB rate 
decisions, FOMC meeting minutes release, speeches given by prominent ECB and FOMC 
Committee members, US employment reports, Category 1 economic data (US GDP, US CPI, 
US ISM manufacturing data, US consumer confidence, German ZEW economic confidence 
data, German IFO economic confidence data and Eurozone CPI) and Category 2 economic data 
(US retail sales data, US Durable Goods, US Manufacturing PMI, German Employment 
Report, European PMI manufacturing, German Industrial Production and German Factory 
Orders).  
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We set up a domain where market-relevant rumours can be pinpointed in time by using Twitter. 
It is important to note, at this point, the definition, and thus selection criteria, of ‘market-
relevant rumours’ for this research. Our selection criteria are based on the source (non-
incumbent, informal source) and ‘actionability’ of a rumour (therefore market relevance). 
Firstly, we define a rumour as unofficial or uncorroborated information pertaining to the 
outcome of a future systematic risk event. It is therefore, the credibility, formality and 
incumbency of the source of this information which is fundamental to the ‘rumour’ definition. 
We select rumours broadcast by commentators not formally associated with the policy-making 
institutes. Any commentator that is associated with the ECB in any formal capacity is 
considered to be releasing formal information, not rumour. The source of the rumour must also 
                                                          
6 It is worth noting that for Eastern Standard Time (New York) the change to daylight saving time occurs sooner and ends later than in Western 
Europe. This can cause some disparity when observing US related information events. We control for these disparate periods when 
constructing public information dummy variables. 
7 A relevance indicator provided by Bloomberg determines the constituent economic data events included in the latter two categories. 
Table 2 
Scheduled public information arrival for period September 29, 2013 to May 08, 2015. 
Announcement  Regular Time 
(GMT)6 
Bloomberg 
Relevance 
Indicator7 
Number of 
Observations  
FOMC Rate Decision 1900/1800 97.6 13 
ECB Rate Decision  1245 97.7 18 
FOMC Minutes 1930/1830 97.6 12 
ECB Speakers Various N/A 46 
FOMC Speakers Various N/A 52 
US Employment Report  1330 99.2 20 
US CPI (Cat 1) 1330/1230 94.4 19 
US GDP (Cat 1) 1330/1230 96.8 19 
US ISM (Cat 1) 1500/1400 96.0 19 
German ZEW (Cat 1) 1000 98.3 19 
German IFO (Cat 1) 0900 96.6 19 
Eurozone CPI YoY (Cat 1) 1000 95.3 19 
US Consumer Confidence (Cat1) 1330/1230 95.2 19 
US Durable Goods (Cat 2) 1330/1230 92.1 19 
US Retail Sales (Cat 2) 1330/1230 91.3 19 
US Manufacturing PMI (Cat 2) 1445/1345 90.0 19 
German Employment Report (Cat 2) 0855 90.0 19 
Eurozone Manufacturing PMI (Cat 2) 0800 to 0900 90.0 19 
German Industrial Production (Cat 2) 0700 or 1100 93.2 20 
German Factory Orders (Cat 2)  0700 or 1100 91.5 20 
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be a non-incumbent information distributor for the information content to be considered 
rumour. For example, Reuters and Bloomberg are government-authorised first-distributors of 
an array of market data and information (see, among others Li et al. 2015). Information released 
through their respective Twitter accounts is associated with this authorisation and therefore 
considered unambiguous. We therefore omit information released from these accounts and 
focus on ‘in the know’ market commentators. ‘In the know’ is defined by the recognition 
(number of followers) such commentators have on the social media platform Twitter. This 
following may be due to the credibility of past rumour broadcasts.8  
Secondly, we define the ‘actionability’ of a rumour based on the scope of the content, time of 
arrival and diffusion among commentators. We select rumours with large enough scope to be 
potentially relevant for market agents active in macro-markets. The selection of ECB policy 
related rumours makes this criteria attainable. The arrival of the rumour must take place prior 
to the relevant policy announcement. Finally, the rumour must be sufficiently absorbed by 
enough market commentators to be considered ‘actionable’. We measure this by the number of 
times the rumour is repeated or requoted.  
Preliminary analysis of the EUR-USD market shows that of the largest 25 absolute returns for 
our sample, 10 occur concurrently with the arrival of news associated with the ECB (see Table 
3). It is, therefore, appropriate that we focus on highly relevant market rumours relating to 
forthcoming ECB actions or changes in remit. Such highly relevant market rumours are 
appropriate examples of actionable information discerned by market actors but not yet 
investigated by economists. Rumours of this type are quoted as ‘ECB sources’ stories. These 
rumours are regularly reported by ‘in the know’ financial market commentators via Twitter. 
ECB-sources stories are particularly prevalent within a one-week window of the ECB’s 
Governing Council meeting that takes place on a monthly basis. We can gauge the popularity 
of an ECB-sources story by the number of times the quoted rumour is repeated. It is relatively 
simple to search Twitter archives for the phrase ‘ECB sources’. We select ECB rumour events 
where the quoted story is repeated by more than 20 ‘in the know’ financial market 
commentators. We then perform an advanced search for the full quoted story, e.g. ‘ECB 
Sources: ECB is working on a discussion paper to execute government bond buying’, and 
pinpoint the time of the first broadcast of the quote. In total, we collect times for the first 
                                                          
8 A study of the reasons behind said credibility is not carried out in this paper; however, this could prove an interesting area for further 
research. 
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broadcast of 63 ECB rumour events. Details of the 63 ‘ECB sources’ events are given in the 
appendix. 
All such broadcasts are timestamped to within one-minute accuracy, which alleviates the 
difficulty of pinpointing the arrival of a rumour in time. Moreover, the unique nature of Twitter 
as a broadcasting mechanism is that commentators are not subject to stringent financial 
regulatory body mandates and in-house substantiation filtration systems. This fundamentally 
differentiates Twitter from incumbent financial news broadcasters such as Bloomberg and 
Reuters.  
Financial market-relevant information broadcast via Twitter is now so important to market 
agents that in September 2015, Bloomberg signed a data agreement with Twitter allowing it to 
incorporate more financially relevant information found on the social media platform (see, e.g., 
Renault 2017, and Bloomberg 2015). Prior to this Bloomberg had limited the inclusion of 
financial information, found on Twitter, to official company filings approved by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission. For this reason, we have limited our sample to end in May 2015.  
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4. Methodology 
To infer any meaningful exchange rate volatility effect due to the arrival of new information, 
we need to account for the intraday pattern in absolute returns found in the previous section. 
We make use of the Andersen and Bollerslev’s (1998) empirical model as it is the most closely 
aligned with our aim of detecting exchange rate return variability linked with the arrival of new 
information. This model has been developed specifically for the purpose of controlling for the 
diurnal pattern persistent in intraday data. By design, the model is flexible and can be adapted 
to control for latent daily volatility clustering, low-frequency calendar effects and the arrival 
of heterogeneous public information other than the principal rumour information in question. 
The model has been applied by several scholars to study the volatility effects of the arrival of 
new information on equity, currency, bonds and their respective futures markets (see, e.g. 
Bauwens et al. 2005, Andersen and Bollerslev 1998, Bollerslev et al. 2000, and Andersen et al. 
2000). 
In order to ‘smooth’ out intraday periodicity we must consider two scales of time; day t and 
interval n within day t. Thus, 𝑅𝑡,𝑛 is the market return at interval n of day t (e.g. 2200 GMT 
would be n = 1 for a given day, t). The model can be specified as follows:  
𝑅𝑡,𝑛 −  ?̅?𝑡,𝑛 = 𝜎𝑡,𝑛 ∙ 𝑠𝑡,𝑛 ∙ 𝑍𝑡,𝑛 
where ?̅?𝑡,𝑛, is the expected market return, which is defined as a sample mean of 1-minute 
returns. 𝑍𝑡,𝑛, is a normally distributed error term with mean zero and unit variance, whereas 
the term 𝑠𝑡,𝑛 captures the intraday periodicity and heterogeneous public information arrival, as 
well as ECB rumour events. Finally, 𝜎𝑡,𝑛 captures a latent volatility component at intra-day 
frequency which is computed by means of the following formula: 
?̂?𝑡,𝑛 = ?̂?𝑡/𝑁
1/2 
where N is the number of intervals in each day (1440) and ?̂?𝑡 is daily volatility estimated by 
applying GARCH models to the EUR-USD series.   
[2] 
[3] 
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Figure 4 
Bayesian and Consistent Akaike Information Criterion calculated for Flexible Fourier Form (FFF) regression 
where order of expansion P takes values from 1 to 50. 
 
 
In order to fully specify a functional model from the general representation outlined in eq.[2], 
the components are log-transformed and squared. This allows for the isolation of the term st,n 
as the sole explanatory component of a normalised and debased 1-minute EUR-USD volatility 
process: 
2 ln[|𝑅𝑡,𝑛 − ?̅?𝑡,𝑛|] − ln ?̂?𝑡,𝑛
2 = 𝑐 + 2 ln 𝑠𝑡,𝑛 + 𝜀𝑡,𝑛 
The final model is defined by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) as two-step Flexible Fourier 
Form (FFF) regression. The first step requires appropriate estimates of the sample mean, ?̅?𝑡,𝑛, 
a GARCH estimate of the latent daily volatility component ?̂?𝑡 and the specification of the 
public information, intraday pattern and rumour event components of st,n. The second step is 
the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of the FFF model provided below in its final form:  
2ln
|𝑅𝑡,𝑛 − ?̅?𝑡,𝑛|
?̂?𝑡/𝑁1/2
= 𝑐 + 𝛿0,1
𝑛
𝑁
+ 𝛿0,2
 𝑛2
𝑁
+ ∑ 𝜆𝑘𝐼𝑘(𝑡, 𝑛) +
𝐷
𝑘=1
∑ (𝛿𝑐,𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑠
𝑝2𝜋
𝑁
𝑛 + 𝛿𝑠,𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑛
𝑝2𝜋
𝑁
𝑛) +
𝑃
𝑝=1
𝜀𝑡,𝑛 
where the unknown parameters to estimate are 𝑐, 𝛿0,1, 𝛿0,2, 𝛿𝑐,𝑝, 𝛿𝑠,𝑝, and 𝜆𝑘, with p = 1, …, P and 
k = 1, .., D. The ∑ (𝛿𝑐,𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑠
𝑝2𝜋
𝑁
𝑛 + 𝛿𝑠,𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑛
𝑝2𝜋
𝑁
𝑛)𝑃𝑝=1  sinusoidal parameter (Fourier series) 
controls for the intraday seasonality component of each day t of N intervals (1440). This allows 
for linear estimation of the volatility impact attributable to public information and rumour 
events k, for interval n, on day t, represented by 𝐼𝑘(𝑡, 𝑛). Normalising constants n/N and n
2/N 
are linear and quadratic trends within each day, where n =1, …, 1440. P determines the order 
of expansion (pitch) of the sinusoidal components in the trigonometric variable. An order of 
[4] 
[5] 
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expansion of 4–8 has been implemented in previous adoptions of this model (Andersen and 
Bollerslev 1997b; Bollerslev et al. 2000). The order of expansion (P) appropriate for the FFF 
regression implemented with one-minute frequency data used in this analysis is likely to 
deviate from the above studies, given their use of 5-minute data. We determine the appropriate 
order of expansion by calculating the Bayesian and Consistent Akaike Information Criterion 
for eq.[5] where P ranges from 1 to 50. The results of model comparison provided in Figure 4 
shows that the optimum value for the order of expansion of the Fourier series is P = 25. The 
periodic pattern can be converted to absolute returns, exclusive of dummy variables, as follows:  
|𝑅𝑡,𝑛 − ?̅?𝑡,𝑛| = 𝑁
−1
2⁄ ∙ ?̂?𝑡 ∙ exp (
?̂? + ?̂?0,1
𝑛
𝑁 + ?̂?0,2
 𝑛2
𝑁 +
∑ (?̂?𝑐,𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑠
𝑝2𝜋
𝑁 𝑛 + ?̂?𝑠,𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑛
𝑝2𝜋
𝑁 𝑛)
𝑃
𝑝=1
2
) ∙ exp(𝜀?̂?,𝑛 2⁄ ) 
A comparative illustration is provided in Figure 5 between 1-minute average trading day 
realised absolute returns and fitted absolute returns implied by the FFF model and calculated 
in eq.[6]. Charts a, b and c demonstrate the improvement in fit when the tuning parameter P is 
increased from 6 to 12 and then to 25 – with the latter being the optimal order of expansion.  
OLS estimation of the FFF regression outlined above will provide consistent parameter 
estimates for information and rumour events, given correct specification of the sinusoidal term 
according to Andersen and Bollerslev (1998). The heteroscedasticity correction and log 
transformation in the first step of the sequential FFF approach enhance the efficiency of linear 
parameter estimates for public information and rumour event dummies in the second step. We 
double-check that this is the case by simulating 1000 trials of the “absolute returns series as 
specified by eq.[5]” using the Monte Carlo approach. We find all parameter estimates (OLS) 
in the second step FFF regression to be normally distributed, including all 25 𝛿𝑐,𝑝 and 𝛿𝑠,𝑝 
coefficients. This simulation exercise suggests that the finite sample properties of the above 
OLS estimates do not depart from the standard asymptotic properties.9 For the daily sample 
period, 29 September, 2013 to 08 May, 2015, we observe large exchange rate fluctuations 
(Figure 6a) particularly for the latter part of the 414 day, sample period. We model such periods 
of heightened volatility by means of an exponentially weighted EGARCH(1,1) specification 
that we fit to the daily EUR-USD returns series. Such specification turns out to be the best 
equipped to capture the direction and persistence of volatility shocks in the daily sample. Figure 
6b depicts the estimated daily volatility obtained. 
                                                          
9 The empirical results from the above Monte Carlo simulations are available from the authors upon request. 
[6] 
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Figure 5 
Comparative illustration: Fit of the Fourier component, with tuning parameter P=6, 12 and 25, of the FFF 
model to the average absolute one-minute EUR-USD returns across the 24-hour trading day. (a) Fit of the 
Fourier component with tuning parameter P = 6 of the FFF model to the average absolute one-minute EUR-
USD returns across the 24-hour trading day. (b) Fit of the Fourier component with tuning parameter P = 12 of 
the FFF model to the average absolute one-minute EUR-USD returns across the 24-hour trading day. (c) Fit of 
the Fourier component with tuning parameter P = 25 of the FFF model to the average absolute one-minute 
EUR-USD returns across the 24-hour trading day. 
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Overall, in the light of the supporting evidence from the Akaike and Bayesian Information 
Criterion for the first-step procedure for eq.[5], along with additional results of the Monte Carlo 
simulation of the second step procedure, we conclude the FFF model is an appropriate tool for 
the purpose of this study. 
  
Figure 6 
(a) Raw daily returns for 414-day period from 29 September, 2013 through 08 May, 2015. (b) Conditional standard 
deviation inference from an EGARCH(1,1) model for daily EUR-USD returns for 29 September, 2013 through 08 
May, 2015. 
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5. Empirical findings 
5.1. Preliminary analysis 
We begin by tabulating the 25 largest absolute one-minute returns over the full sample period. 
We then cross-reference the times and dates of these abrupt changes in exchange rate with our 
sample of the public and actionable information data set. The same matching exercise was 
followed by Fleming and Remolona (1999), Andersen, Bollerslev and Cai (2000) and 
Bollerslev, Cai and Song (2000) in their analyses of return variability in stock, bond and 
currency markets in response to public information arrival. Their results show, in consensus, 
that the largest 25 absolute returns of their respective markets of interest occur during times of 
public information arrival. We carry out the same exercise for our data set and find that of the 
25 largest absolute returns, 21 occur during times of public information arrival. These last, 
together with their matched information/rumour event, are reported in Table 3.  
Twenty of the largest jumps in exchange rate can be attributed to scheduled public information 
and one to the unscheduled announcement of the approval of an economic assistance package 
for Greece. These 21 events were corroborated, certified and reported by the accredited 
newswire Bloomberg. Such information has in the past been referred to as fundamental 
financial market information; relevant, ‘rational’ public market information reported by an 
authorised newswire. Four of the 25 largest absolute EUR-USD returns for our full sample 
period occurred during times of ‘actionable’ information arrival. Three of these events were 
rumours of forthcoming ECB action reported by ‘in the know’ commentators broadcasting on 
Twitter. The fourth was the reporting of the arrival of Russian troops in Crimea by independent 
Twitter users. 
While this matching exercise is somewhat subjective, the results reported in Table 3 suggest 
that ‘actionable’ rumours discerned by market agents could have a sizable impact on market 
price. These matching results provide the basis for the hypothesis that the availability of Twitter 
as a medium for rumour diffusion would enable economists to identify a form of ambiguous – 
yet actionable – information that can be associated with significant fluctuations in market 
prices. We conclude this to be substantial preliminary support for the hypothesis that market 
rumours – i.e., information previously not discerned and categorised as private information or 
mis-identified as not fundamental – are of value to traders and they are a constituent factor of 
market price formation. 
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5.2. Intraday periodicity  
The highly persistent intraday volatility pattern evident in one-minute absolute returns 
illustrated in Figure 2 is consistent with the findings of previous studies based on intraday data. 
For instance, Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), Bollerslev et al. (2000) and Bawuens et al. 
(2005) all found evidence of intraday periodicity of this type for five-minute interval data and 
adopted the FFF regression approach to control for this. Their selection of smaller sets of tuning 
parameters (8, 4, 6 and 4 respectively) is appropriate for lower frequency five-minute data.10  
                                                          
10 Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) is the only study to include parameter results of the cosinor element of the FFF regression. 
They find all but one of the sinusoidal parameters, the fourth sine variable, to be significant. 
Table 3 
Largest absolute 1-minute returns for EUR-USD spot exchange rate market from 29 September, 2013 through 
08 May, 2015. For each of the 25 largest absolute returns, we indicate the information/rumour event, which 
may have contributed to returns. 
Absolute 
Returns 
(%)  
Timestamp 
(GMT) 
Return 
Interval 
Information/Rumour event 
0.942 03/04/2015 1330 930 US Employment Report  
0.878 07/11/2013 1245 885 ECB Rate Decisions  
0.875 18/03/2015 2004 1384 FED Press Conference  
0.823 06/03/2015 1331 931 US Employment Report  
0.786 22/01/2015 1344 944 ECB Press Conference  
0.761 22/01/2015 1340 940 ECB Press Conference  
0.617 18/03/2015 1800 1260 FED Rate Decision  
0.587 06/02/2015 1330 930 US Employment Report  
0.571 20/02/2015 1735 1175 Euro group decide to extend financial assistance to Greece  
0.564 18/03/2015 2005 1385 FED Rate Decision  
0.535 05/12/2014 1330 930 US Employment Report  
0.479 12/03/2015 1230 930 US Retail Sales  
0.422 18/02/2015 1900 1260 FOMC Minutes 
0.421 03/10/2014 1330 930 US Employment Report  
0.404 04/09/2014 1245 885 ECB Rate Decisions  
0.388 22/01/2015 1345 945 ECB Press Conference  
0.375 07/02/2014 1330 930 US Employment Report  
0.367 18/03/2015 2003 1383 FED Rate Decision  
0.363 04/12/2014 1732 1172 ECB Sources (Twitter): German ECB members opposed 
to new balance sheet language 
0.356 17/09/2014 1900 1260 FED Rate Decision  
0.344 06/11/2014 1333 933 ECB Press Conference  
0.342 28/02/2014 1000 720 Rumours of Russian troops in Sevastopol emerge on 
Twitter 
0.340 20/11/2013 1520 1040 ECB Sources (Twitter): Governing council considering 
negative deposit rate of 0.1% 
0.339 21/01/2015 1435 995 ECB Sources (Twitter): QE proposal calls for roughly €50 
billion in bond buying per month  
0.338 29/10/2014 1800 1260 FED Rate Decision 
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Table 4 
Coefficient estimates for constant, normalising constants and Fourier components of the FFF regression of 
eq.[5]. Results set out for the complete FFF regression (inclusive of public information and ECB rumour event 
dummies), and for the same regression with both rumour and public information events excluded.  
Parameter  FFF regression  t-Stat Rumours excluded t-Stat Periodic pattern Only t-Stat 
c 14.26 3.772 14.32 3.779 14.974 3.905 
δ0,1 -116.8 -5.155 -117.2 -5.163 -121.5 -5.290 
δ0,2 0.081 5.136 0.081 5.144 0.084 5.271 
δc,1 -13.42 -5.851 -13.45 -5.852 -13.83 -5.947 
δs,1 -1.874 -35.28 -1.864 -35.03 -1.815 -33.71 
δc,2 -3.090 -5.389 -3.103 -5.401 -3.226 -5.547 
δs,2 0.057 2.033 0.054 1.927 0.043 1.531 
δc,3 -1.744 -6.837 -1.744 -6.827 -1.796 -6.946 
δs,3 0.536 26.56 0.537 26.55 0.514 25.11 
δc,4 -0.793 -5.517 -0.796 -5.529 -0.843 -5.784 
δs,4 -0.758 -45.66 -0.762 -45.81 -0.717 -42.63 
δc,5 -0.514 -5.571 -0.518 -5.600 -0.492 -5.255 
δs,5 -0.057 -3.911 -0.051 -3.476 -0.041 -2.766 
δc,6 -0.333 -5.166 -0.329 -5.092 -0.348 -5.315 
δs,6 -0.057 -4.239 -0.058 -4.289 -0.084 -6.150 
δc,7 -0.187 -3.898 -0.186 -3.879 -0.195 -4.015 
δs,7 -0.080 -6.290 -0.079 -6.177 -0.052 -4.084 
δc,8 -0.105 -2.813 -0.105 -2.802 -0.104 -2.746 
δs,8 0.113 9.270 0.111 9.082 0.104 8.477 
δc,9 -0.157 -5.211 -0.158 -5.245 -0.155 -5.065 
δs,9 -0.002 -0.178 -0.006 -0.470 -0.016 -1.298 
δc,10 -0.117 -4.664 -0.120 -4.782 -0.133 -5.222 
δs,10 0.023 1.985 0.025 2.143 0.034 2.872 
δc,11 -0.105 -4.850 -0.105 -4.867 -0.104 -4.774 
δs,11 0.058 5.153 0.056 4.912 0.034 2.962 
δc,12 -0.071 -3.731 -0.072 -3.801 -0.082 -4.249 
δs,12 -0.067 -6.024 -0.065 -5.841 -0.055 -4.826 
δc,13 -0.096 -5.652 -0.094 -5.539 -0.107 -6.186 
δs,13 0.012 1.095 0.013 1.158 0.012 1.069 
δc,14 -0.056 -3.571 -0.056 -3.576 -0.032 -2.010 
δs,14 0.015 1.351 0.012 1.101 0.008 0.762 
δc,15 0.012 0.853 0.012 0.821 -0.016 -1.101 
δs,15 -0.077 -7.131 -0.075 -6.897 -0.082 -7.457 
δc,16 -0.051 -3.752 -0.052 -3.794 -0.045 -3.271 
δs,16 0.032 2.955 0.032 2.927 0.043 3.946 
δc,17 -0.004 -0.286 -0.002 -0.175 0.009 0.678 
δs,17 0.034 3.194 0.035 3.284 0.042 3.822 
δc,18 0.037 2.986 0.037 2.960 0.031 2.476 
δs,18 -0.011 -1.024 -0.012 -1.083 -0.037 -3.430 
δc,19 -0.018 -1.506 -0.019 -1.566 -0.039 -3.210 
δs,19 0.050 4.686 0.049 4.570 0.065 6.018 
δc,20 0.010 0.863 0.010 0.889 0.029 2.434 
δs,20 -0.032 -3.055 -0.032 -3.028 -0.027 -2.515 
δc,21 0.063 0.511 0.061 5.333 0.050 4.259 
δs,21 -0.015 -1.440 -0.016 -1.499 -0.034 -3.161 
δc,22 0.025 2.243 0.026 2.337 0.021 1.869 
δs,22 0.021 1.999 0.022 2.113 0.035 3.312 
δc,23 0.065 5.799 0.064 5.768 0.066 5.865 
δs,23 -0.049 -4.652 -0.049 -4.684 -0.048 -4.508 
δc,24 0.180 16.34 0.180 16.35 0.182 16.32 
δs,24 0.024 2.260 0.024 2.246 0.021 1.955 
δc,25 0.042 3.835 0.041 3.746 0.036 3.218 
δs,25 -0.003 -0.325 -0.004 -0.364 -0.001 -0.064 
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For the purpose of this study, we find a tuning parameter of 25 to be the most appropriate for 
the one-minute frequency EUR-USD returns sample, as outlined in Section 4. In Table 4 we 
set out parameter estimates for the intraday periodicity control component of the FFF 
regression of eq.[5]. The second and third column report the parameter estimates for the full 
FFF regression inclusive of rumour and public information dummy variables. The remaining 
columns report parameter estimates obtained when the rumour event dummy variables and 
when the rumour and public information event dummy variables, respectively, are excluded 
from the FFF regression11. The results show that most of the fifty sinusoidal parameter 
estimates are significant and perform well in controlling for the highly persistent intraday 
periodicity in absolute EUR-USD returns. As with findings presented by Andersen and 
Bollerslev (1998), some Fourier series parameter estimates are insignificant. The inclusion of 
such terms is, however necessary for better smoothing of the intraday periodic component.12 
Most notably, results in Table 4 show that the inclusion of rumour and public information 
dummy variables reduces the number of significant sinusoidal parameters and the respective 
size of their coefficient estimates. Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), Andersen et al. (2000) and 
Bauwens et al. (2005) have all suggested and supported the idea that intraday periodicity is a 
manifestation of price variability resulting from the existence of private information. From 
these results, we can conclude that the inclusion of a relatively small number of rumour event 
variables is able to absorb some volatility dynamics previously captured by the intraday 
periodic components.  
  
                                                          
11 The 𝑅2 for FFF regression, rumours excluded and periodic pattern only are 0.0953, 0.0941 and 0.0895 respectively. 
12 For example, the inclusion of the insignificant ninth sine parameter (δs,9) facilitates the inclusion of the subsequent 
significant sinusoidal parameters. 
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5.3. Volatility response structure 
Macroeconomic public information and rumour events occur infrequently in our sample period 
relative to the large number of 596,160 EUR-USD return observations. We observe 63 rumour 
events and control for 20 categories of macroeconomic announcements the summation of 
which is 492 observations of information events. The relative infrequency of such events and 
persistent noise in high frequency intraday data – as noted in Sections 3.2 and 4 – make 
coefficient point-estimation of independent events and corresponding time intervals following 
the events implausible (Andersen and Bollerslev 1997). The inclusion of an FOMC rate 
decision event as a 1-minute dummy variable in eq.[5], for example, would result in an 
insignificant coefficient estimate given the aforementioned infrequency of such an event. To 
control for this feature of our dataset, one option is to extend event dummy variables to a longer 
time horizon, say 60 minutes following the event instead of 1 minute. This solution would 
improve the chances of getting significant coefficient estimates. These last, however, would 
provide only a broad-brush picture of the immediate impact of information arrival on the 
volatility of exchange rate. In this case, the coefficient estimates would only suggest some 
impact on volatility during the 60-minute event window. Empirical estimates of eq.[5] with 60-
minute dummy variables capturing rumour events are reported in Table 6.  
Andersen and Bollerslev (1997) have proposed an alternative methodology to gain better 
insight into the instantaneous and cumulative impact of information events on price variability. 
They propose that volatility response in exchange rates following information arrival can be 
proxied with an average volatility pattern across all such events. They calibrate this pattern by 
fitting a third-order polynomial to volatility observations during announcement event windows. 
The fitted volatility response pattern is then included in the FFF regression as an explanatory 
variable to calculate the degree to which absolute returns during the event “load onto” this 
pattern. The implication of this is that, for each information event k and subsequent Nk time 
intervals, the 𝐼𝑘(𝑡, 𝑛) term in eq.[5] is replaced with a calibrated volatility response pattern 
𝛾(𝑖) where 𝑖 = 0,1,2 … , 𝑁𝑘. Given that this volatility response pattern is pre-determined, an 
estimated coefficient 𝜆k loading onto this pattern during event k, enables the calculation of the 
immediate volatility impact of an information event. The immediate volatility response in 
absolute returns (from eq.[6]) is given by exp (?̂?𝑘 ∙ 𝛾(0) 2⁄ ) − 1, whereas the same response 
for the subsequent time intervals is given by exp (?̂?𝑘 ∙ 𝛾(𝑖) 2⁄ ) − 1. The cumulative response 
in absolute returns for the full event window is calculated as:  
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𝑀(𝑘) = ∑ [exp (
?̂?𝑘 ∙ 𝛾(𝑖)
2
) − 1]
𝑁𝑘
𝑖=0
 
While Andersen and Bollerslev (1997) adopt a single volatility response pattern for 
macroeconomic information arrival, we calibrate four volatility response patterns specific to 
the type of macroeconomic information event and calibrate a further volatility response pattern 
specific to rumour event windows. The intuition is that the volatility response pattern following 
information arrival differs depending on the speed of information arrival as well as the type of 
information content. For instance, during macroeconomic events such as the ECB rate decision 
where a press conference is held, information arrival is incremental. This is contrary to 
macroeconomic data release, where information arrival is immediate.  
We calibrate volatility response patterns specific to ECB rumour events, ECB rate decision 
events, FOMC rate decision events, slow-release public information events (FOMC minutes, 
FOMC and ECB prominent speakers) and fast-release public information events (US 
Employment report, US GDP, US CPI, US ISM manufacturing data, US consumer confidence, 
German ZEW economic confidence data, German IFO economic confidence data, Eurozone 
CPI, US retail sales data, US Durable Goods, US Manufacturing PMI, German Employment 
Report, European PMI manufacturing, German Industrial Production and German Factory 
Orders).  
The four volatility response patterns for macroeconomic announcements are calibrated by 
fitting a third-order polynomial to the dummy variables attached to the event windows for the 
four categories of macroeconomic information. The polynomial restricts the volatility response 
window to 60 minutes for all macroeconomic information releases, except the ECB and FOMC 
rate decisions, for which the response window is extended to 120 minutes to accommodate the 
lengthy press conference that follows the decision announcement.  
The third-order polynomials calibrated for the volatility response following ECB (eq.[8]) and 
FOMC rate decisions (eq.[9]) are provided below:  
 𝛾(𝑖) = 5.577[1 − (𝑖 120⁄ )3] − 0.127[1 − (𝑖 120)⁄
2
]𝑖 + 0.00301[1 − (𝑖 120)⁄ ]𝑖2 
𝛾(𝑖) = 8.856[1 − (𝑖 120⁄ )3] − 0.228[1 − (𝑖 120)⁄
2
]𝑖 + 0.00412[1 − (𝑖 120)⁄ ]𝑖2 
[7] 
[8] 
[9] 
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where 𝑖 = 0,1,2 … ,120. We then specify the third-order polynomials calibrated for the 
volatility response following slow-release public information events (eq.[10]) and fast-release 
public information events (eq.[11]) as follows:  
𝛾(𝑖) = 3.850[1 − (𝑖 60⁄ )3] − 0.218[1 − (𝑖 60)⁄
2
]𝑖 + 0.00733[1 − (𝑖 60)⁄ ]𝑖2 
𝛾(𝑖) = 4.527[1 − (𝑖 60⁄ )3] − 0.326[1 − (𝑖 60)⁄
2
]𝑖 + 0.0100[1 − (𝑖 60)⁄ ]𝑖2 
where 𝑖 = 0,1,2 … ,60.  
The volatility response pattern for ECB rumour event windows is calibrated through a higher 
7th-order polynomial fitted to all parameters of eq.[5] relevant for ECB rumour event windows. 
The choice of higher-order polynomial allows for more flexibility in capturing greater 
fluctuations in the volatility pattern throughout rumour event windows. Intuitively, the 
ambiguous nature of market rumours could in fact result in a less cohesive price formation 
process. From experimentation and evidence presented in Figure 8 we can see that, contrary to 
‘fundamental’ macroeconomic events, the volatility response following rumour events does 
not decay consistently across the event window. There is a distinct decrease, followed by an 
increase in volatility response for five 1-minute intervals following the arrival of a rumour 
before volatility begins to decay again. A higher-order polynomial allows for better calibration 
of this distinct pattern. The 7th-order polynomial calibrated for the volatility response 
following ECB rumour events (eq.[12]) is specified as follows:  
𝛾(𝑖) = 2.75𝑒−10𝑖7 − 6.60𝑒−8𝑖6 + 6.25𝑒−6𝑖5 − 2.98𝑒−4𝑖4 − 0.0075𝑖3 + 0.096𝑖2 − 0.52𝑖 + 0.19 
where 𝑖 = 0,1,2 … ,60. 
  
 [10] 
  [11] 
[12] 
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Figure 7 
(a) Estimated volatility response pattern for FOMC and ECB rate decision event windows. (b) Estimated volatility response 
pattern for slow-release public information events. (c and d) Estimated volatility response pattern for fast-release public 
information events. 
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5.4. Public information announcement effect 
Figure 7 illustrates the shape of the estimated volatility-response patterns calculated as 
 ?̂?(𝑘, 𝑖) = ?̂?𝑘 ∙ 𝛾(𝑖) for each of the 20 macroeconomic public information announcements. 
Figure 7a illustrates the volatility-response patterns following ECB and FOMC rate decisions, 
where their different scale is determined by the degree to which absolute returns during such 
events load onto the decay structures of eqs.[8]-[9]. Figure 7b depicts the volatility-response 
patterns following slow-release macroeconomic announcements. Also, in this case, such 
patterns are determined by the degree to which absolute returns during such events load onto 
decay structure of eq.[10]. Figure 7c and 7d display the response patterns for the fast-release 
macroeconomic data announcements where the volatility-decay structure is specified in 
eq.[11]. The volatility persists at a higher level and for a longer time horizon during ECB and 
FOMC rate decisions. For slow-release public information, the immediate volatility response 
is smaller but decays at a slower rate. The volatility response to fast-release economic data 
announcements, is more immediate but volatility decays at a far faster rate.  
Table 5 reports the empirical estimates of the loading coefficient ?̂?𝑘 for all 20 macroeconomic 
information announcements. Such coefficients are OLS estimates of eq.[5] where the 𝐼𝑘(𝑡, 𝑛) 
dummy variable refers to the predetermined volatility-response patterns associated with the 
relevant type of macroeconomic information, as determined by eqs.[8]-[11]. All but two of the 
20 public information announcements are significant at the 5% level. The announcements are 
ranked by order of largest instantaneous impact on absolute returns, calculated as 
exp (?̂?𝑘 ∙ 𝛾(0) 2⁄ ) − 1. 
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To provide an example, the estimated FOMC rate decision loading coefficient implies that 
exp (?̂?𝑘 ∙ 𝛾(0) 2⁄ ) = exp ((0.729 ∙ 8.856)/2) = 25.23 – this is tantamount to an 
approximately 2423% ((25.23 − 1) ∙ 100) instantaneous increase in the 1-minute absolute 
returns following FOMC rate decisions. The cumulative impact as outlined in eq.[7] would be 
678.64. Given that 1-minute average absolute returns, during the 1800 to 2000 GMT time 120-
minute horizon for FOMC rate decisions, are approximately equal to 0.008% and that average 
cumulative absolute returns for the trading days in our sample equal 11%, on days when FOMC 
rate decisions take place there is an average increase of approximately (678.64 ∙ 0.008)/11 =
49.36% in cumulative absolute returns.  
 
 
Table 5 
Public information arrival effects on the volatility of 1-minute EUR-USD exchange rate returns. 
Public information 
announcements 
Coefficient 
?̂?k   
t-Stat Instantaneous 
increase in 
volatility (%) 
Effect on daily 
cumulative 
absolute returns 
(%) 
FOMC Rate Decision 0.729 36.55 2423.563 49.36 
US Employment Report  1.382 19.82 2183.577 19.35 
US CPI (Cat 1) 0.973 9.981 805.590 6.619 
US Retail Sales (Cat 2) 0.935 10.78 730.839 9.602 
US GDP (Cat 1) 0.894 9.155 656.767 8.890 
German ZEW (Cat 1) 0.861 8.860 602.211 8.349 
FOMC Minutes 0.955 22.42 528.481 6.675 
ECB Rate Decision  0.656 21.49 523.766 35.53 
German IFO (Cat 1) 0.792 8.188 501.201 5.737 
Eurozone Manufacturing PMI (Cat 2) 0.772 7.973 474.424 5.510 
ECB Speakers 0.776 9.454 345.261 6.619 
FOMC Speakers 0.704 9.268 287.847 4.693 
US ISM (Cat 1) 0.505 4.928 213.608 3.819 
German Factory Orders (Cat 2)  0.491 5.214 203.625 2.364 
US Durable Goods (Cat 2) 0.474 4.838 192.256 3.513 
German Employment Report (Cat 2) 0.332 3.426 111.979 1.772 
Eurozone CPI YoY (Cat 1) 0.313 3.216 102.876 1.349 
German Industrial Production (Cat 2) 0.295 3.137 95.057 1.541 
US Consumer Confidence (Cat1) 0.118 1.191 30.526 0.707 
US Manufacturing PMI (Cat 2) 0.093 0.897 23.406 0.512 
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The results presented in Table 5 show that public announcements – ‘fundamental’ to the price 
formation process by proponents of the Efficient Market Hypothesis – do have a considerable 
immediate and cumulative impact on price variability. The relative infrequency of such events, 
however, means that a very small proportion of overall sample volatility can be attributed to 
such events. Nonetheless, these results show that the FFF regression model in use is able to 
capture the effects of macroeconomic announcement events, and therefore it can be used as 
useful term of comparison for the results of the next section. 
  
34 
 
5.5 ECB rumours arrival effects 
We take two approaches in identifying the impact of ECB rumour events on the volatility of 
EUR-USD absolute returns. The first is to model each ECB rumour event as a 60-minute 
dummy variable in eq.[5]. Here the 𝐼𝑘(𝑡, 𝑛) dummy variables (for k = 1, .., 63), included in the 
full FFF regression take unity value for rumour event k for the sixty minutes after rumour 
arrival. In this case, the macroeconomic event dummy variables also take unity value for their 
respective event windows. The coefficient estimates ?̂?𝑘 for this approach captures the degree 
to which volatility is affected during the full 60-minute rumour event window. The second 
approach consists of including each ECB rumour event as the 60-minute volatility response 
pattern as specified by eq.[12]. In this case, also the macroeconomic control variables are 
modelled through their volatility responses as specified by eqs.[8]-[11]. The coefficient 
estimates ?̂?𝑘 for this second approach captures the degree to which absolute returns, during 
each rumour event window, load onto the pre-specified volatility response pattern.  
Table 6 provides empirical results for the first approach. The rumour events are ranked by the 
magnitude of their coefficient estimates attached to the 60-minute dummy variables. Of the 63 
rumour events, 25 events result in a significant increase in the volatility of absolute returns. 
The largest increase is associated with the arrival of a rumour stating that the ECB Governing 
Council has drawn up a proposal which calls for quantitate easing to the magnitude of €50 
billion on a monthly basis. To provide an example, the coefficient estimate of 3.475 for this 
rumour, implies an exp(3.475/2) − 1 = 209.05% increase in the volatility of absolute returns 
for the respective event arrival.  
The results presented in Table 6 show that the significant rumour events have a positive shock 
on absolute returns. In line with expectations, all of these rumours produce a positive impact 
on volatility, with no rumour having a significant and negative impact. 
The above analysis based on the use of dummy variables provides little insight into how the 
volatility process during the event window evolves. We therefore move on to the second 
approach outlined that should allow greater insight into the immediate and ensuing volatility 
impact of rumour events.  
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Table 6 
Rumours of ECB action: effects on the volatility of 1-minute EUR-USD exchange rate measured as absolute 
returns for a 60-minute event window. Details given for coefficient estimates of the 25 ECB rumour events 
found to be statistically significant. 
ECB rumour events  Coefficient 
𝝀?̂? 
t-Stat Inferred 
increase in 
volatility (%)  
ECB Sources: QE proposal calls for roughly €50 billion in 
bond buying per month  
3.475 4.745 209.054 
ECB Sources: Governing council considering negative 
deposited rate of 0.1% 
3.102 4.237 173.531 
ECB Sources: Existential threat to Euro if fiscal policy reform 
is not tackled 
3.061 4.181 169.986 
ECB Sources: Governing council may not have reached lower 
bound on key rate 
2.894 3.953 156.389 
ECB Sources: Central bankers to challenge Draghi on 
leadership style 
2.644 3.611 138.006 
ECB Sources: Governing council likely to refrain from new 
measures for next few months  
2.609 3.563 135.594 
ECB Sources: Said to allow 24 hours to make smaller ABS 
purchases  
2.598 3.549 134.883 
ECB Sources: New ECB action next week is unlikely 2.514 3.434 129.317 
ECB Sources: ECB raising ELA for Greek banks to €71 
billion 
2.110 2.882 105.663 
ECB Sources: ECB and Treasury building emptied under 
security concern 
2.096 2.862 104.906 
ECB Sources: Rate change unlikely. LTRO not on top of the 
communication agenda 
2.079 2.839 104.021 
ECB Sources: ECB to accept Greek bonds as collateral if deal 
is reached  
2.026 2.759 101.293 
ECB Sources: ECB won't accept Greek bond swap and wants 
full repayment 
2.017 2.755 100.860 
ECB Sources: ECB has approved additional €400 billion for 
Greek banks as emergency liquidity  
1.860 2.540 93.239 
ECB Sources: ECB cites barriers to QE. Need to let old 
measures work 
1.799 2.456 90.418 
ECB Sources: ECB to allow Greek banks ELA up to €60 
billion 
1.723 2.352 87.047 
ECB Sources: Bundesbank still striving to put limits on ECB 
QE 
1.716 2.344 86.765 
ECB Sources: Bundesbank sources say they are willing to 
accept significant stimulus package  
1.652 2.180 84.038 
ECB Sources: Weidmann opposed to today's rate cut 1.574 2.113 80.810 
ECB Sources: No major policy change expected in January  1.537 2.099 79.335 
ECB Sources: ECB buying Spanish short dated covered bonds 1.401 2.091 74.108 
ECB Sources: Markets over interpreting possibility of QE. No 
consensus but intense debate 
1.385 2.068 73.543 
ECB Sources: Preparing package of measures, including cuts 
to all 3 rates for June meeting  
1.324 1.976 71.312 
ECB Sources: Governing council prefer additional time to 
assess current measures 
1.277 1.972 69.672 
ECB Sources: G.C discussing ABS purchases worth up to 
€500 billion which could start this year 
1.268 1.970 69.351 
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Table 7 reports empirical results of the loading coefficient ?̂?𝑘 for rumour events k. The 
coefficient estimates are based on OLS estimation of eq.[5] where the 𝐼𝑘(𝑡, 𝑛) variables refer 
to the predetermined volatility response patterns associated with the ECB rumour event 
windows, as specified in eq.[12]. Of the 63 event windows following ECB rumour arrival, 20 
events are found to have significant loading coefficient ?̂?𝑘.  
The rumour events are ranked by order of biggest instantaneous impact on absolute returns 
calculated as exp (?̂?𝑘 ∙ 𝛾(0) 2⁄ ) − 1. To provide an example, the estimated loading coefficient 
for the ECB rumour, ‘ECB Sources: QE proposal calls for roughly €50 billion in bond buying 
per month’, implies exp (?̂?𝑘 ∙ 𝛾(0) 2⁄ ) = exp ((3.692 ∙ 0.615)/2) = 3.11. This is equivalent 
to an approximately 211%  ((3.11 − 1) ∙ 100)) instantaneous increase in the 1-minute absolute 
return interval following the arrival of this rumour.  
The cumulative impact obtained by applying eq.[7] is as large as 134.95. Given that 1-minute 
average absolute returns during the 1430 to 1530 GMT event window for this rumour are 
approximately equal to 0.013% and that average cumulative absolute returns for the trading 
days in our sample equals 11%, the arrival of this ECB rumour has an average increase of 
approximately (134.95 ∙ 0.013)/11 = 15.95% in cumulative absolute returns.  
The twenty rumour events found to significantly load onto the volatility response patterns of 
eq.[12] are the same as those found to have the most significant coefficients in Table 6 – when 
the rumour event window was a basic 60-minute dummy variable for each event. This would 
suggest that rumour events with the biggest volatility impact load onto the predetermined 
volatility response pattern more effectively.  
Figure 8 depicts the shape of the estimated volatility response patterns calculated as  ?̂?(𝑘, 𝑖) =
?̂?𝑘 ∙ 𝛾(𝑖) for the 5 ECB rumour event windows with the biggest loading coefficients. Such 
patterns are dependent on the degree to which absolute returns during ECB rumour events load 
onto the decay structures given by eq.[12].  
The volatility decay structure following rumour arrival is more complex than that of 
macroeconomic information. There are instantaneous jumps in the volatility of absolute returns 
in the first minute interval following rumour arrival.   
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Such jumps are then followed by a sharp increase in volatility that reaches its peak at the 6th 
one-minute interval. At this point, volatility declines gradually before increasing again 
following the 40th one-minute interval. For flexibility, by design, the 7th order polynomial set 
Table 7 
Rumours of ECB action: effects on the volatility of 1-minute EUR-USD exchange rate as measured by absolute 
returns. Details given for the 20 rumour events which have significant ‘loading’ coefficient ?̂?k estimates for the 
volatility decay structure specified by eq.[12]. 
ECB rumour events  Coefficient 
?̂?k   
t-Stat Instantaneou
s increase in 
volatility (%) 
Increase 
in daily 
cumulativ
e absolute 
returns 
(%) 
ECB Sources: QE proposal calls for roughly €50 
billion in bond buying per month  
3.692 4.544 211.199 15.949 
ECB Sources: Governing council considering 
negative deposited rate of 0.1% 
3.190 3.926 166.647 13.166 
ECB Sources: Existential threat to Euro if fiscal 
policy reform is not tackled 
2.775 3.415 134.711 10.415 
ECB Sources: Governing council may not have 
reached lower bound on key rate 
2.720 3.347 130.774 9.363 
ECB Sources: Central bankers to challenge Draghi 
on leadership style 
2.671 3.287 127.350 9.796 
ECB Sources: Governing council likely to refrain 
from new measures for next few months  
2.624 3.230 124.089 9.523 
ECB Sources: Said to allow 24 hours to make 
smaller ABS purchases  
2.512 3.092 116.500 8.894 
ECB Sources: New ECB action next week is 
unlikely 
2.249 2.768 99.674 7.519 
ECB Sources: ECB raising ELA for Greek banks to 
€71 billion 
2.185 2.688 95.760 6.689 
ECB Sources: ECB and Treasury building emptied 
under security concern 
2.184 2.688 95.712 6.685 
ECB Sources: Rate change unlikely. LTRO not on 
top of the communication agenda 
2.177 2.680 95.318 6.656 
ECB Sources: ECB to accept Greek bonds as 
collateral if deal is reached  
2.154 2.650 93.904 4.535 
ECB Sources: ECB won't accept Greek bond swap 
and wants full repayment 
2.110 2.597 91.333 6.359 
ECB Sources: ECB has approved additional €400 
billion for Greek banks as emergency liquidity  
2.086 2.567 89.919 5.292 
ECB Sources: ECB cites barriers to QE. Need to let 
old measures work 
2.067 2.544 88.829 4.274 
ECB Sources: ECB to allow Greek banks ELA up 
to €60 billion 
2.067 2.539 88.793 6.646 
ECB Sources: Bundesbank still striving to put 
limits on ECB QE 
1.935 2.382 81.313 5.620 
ECB Sources: Weidmann opposed to today's rate 
cut 
1.911 2.351 79.961 4.672 
ECB Sources: No major policy change expected in 
January  
1.895 2.332 79.063 5.876 
ECB Sources: Bundesbank sources say they are 
willing to accept significant stimulus package  
1.792 2.206 73.510 3.498 
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out in eq.[12] does not reach zero. This is justified given that volatility persistence is evident, 
in Figure 8, up to the 60th minute and beyond.  
Figure 8 
Five rumour events with the largest volatility response factor are graphed below.  
 
 
All in all, the empirical findings detailed in this section show that there is a significant increase 
in the volatility of EUR-USD rate for 60-minute event windows during which ECB rumours 
arrive and circulate on Twitter. The rumour events with the biggest volatility impact follow 
quite similar volatility response patterns, producing jumps in absolute returns as large as 211% 
and increases in cumulative daily absolute returns as large as 15%. These findings point to the 
existence of a form of actionable market information able to explain a significant share of the 
large volatility in the EUR-USD spot exchange rate. 
As a further test of our central hypothesis, we carry out empirical estimates of eq.[5] for a split 
sample of days with rumour and days without rumour. Due to the existence of days with 
multiple rumours, this is tantamount to 58 days (83,520 observations) with rumours and 356 
days (512,640) without rumours. The R2 for the sample with and without ECB rumours is 
calculated to be 0.1032 and 0.0933 respectively. This is tantamount to a 10.61% improvement 
in explaining excess volatility with the discernment of ECB rumours.  
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6. Conclusions 
This study identifies market-relevant rumours as a form of public information that has been 
largely overlooked by price discovery literature. We present a new database of previously 
undetected public information that is able to explain a substantial share of the excess volatility 
observed on foreign exchange markets. We therefore assert that such rumours are actionable 
information as – by changing market consensus upon broadcast – they have substantial impact 
on the volatility of the EUR-USD exchange rate. More specifically, we pinpoint the arrival of 
63 rumours of forthcoming ECB action, as broadcast via Twitter, to within 1-minute accuracy. 
We show that 25 of such rumours have a pronounced impact on the volatility of 1-minute EUR-
USD exchange rate returns for a 420-day sample period. The instantaneous increase in 
volatility during the first minute of rumour arrival is up to 211%, while the cumulative increase 
in volatility over a 60-minute window is as much as 2614%. 
The findings of this paper demonstrate the existence of financial market-relevant information 
seemingly discerned by market agents but overlooked by economists. The identification of 
rumour information events as a determinant in the price formation process offers new 
opportunities to understand the proportion of volatility in financial markets left unexplained by 
the arrival of scheduled and unscheduled public information as broadcast via incumbent 
financial market news sources such as Bloomberg and Reuters. Furthermore, the hypothesis 
attributing market volatility to private information can be, to some extent, scaled down in the 
light of the existence of market rumours previously misidentified as private information that 
can, in fact, be classified as public information.  
Our empirical results highlight a number of implications for both central banks and market 
regulators. The existence of such ‘actionable information’ suggests that an unofficial channel 
of communication exists between central banks and market participants. This may be a 
transmission mechanism through which sensitive information can be incrementally passed onto 
the market in order to prevent overwhelming volatility events. Alternatively, the existence of 
such rumours may be in direct violation of the central banks’ intent, in which case the 
acknowledgement and repudiation of such rumours is of vital importance for the central bank. 
For the market regulator there are implications in terms of informational efficiency. It is 
plausible to argue that the existence of ‘actionable rumours’ via Twitter increases the 
informational efficiency of financial markets. The network of ‘in the know’ market 
commentators provides market participants with a source of free market-relevant information 
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at the point of delivery – the same type of information that is often highly expensive to retrieve 
in real time via incumbent newswires. In principle, such a reduction in the cost of information 
might mitigate informational asymmetries, making informed trading less costly and therefore 
reducing the role of speculative trading. This assertion remains valid, with the caveat that 
rumours are indeed actionable and not ‘noise’. The efficient distinction between ‘actionable 
rumours' and ‘noise’ can depend on the market agent’s ability to discern reliable ‘in the know’ 
commentators. Further, the lack of regulatory jurisdiction over Twitter needs to be addressed 
given the degree to which information disseminated through Twitter can impact market prices, 
as we have shown in this paper. The deliberate distribution of false market-relevant news via 
Twitter may result in significant volatility events beneficial to the distributor.  
There are significant opportunities for further research supported by the findings of this study 
and the rumour dataset identified in our empirical analysis. For instance, uncertainty and risk 
perception measures could be used as a control variable to investigate the relative importance 
of rumours. Bilgin et al. 2018 and Gozgor et al. 2016 show that uncertainty measures such as 
the VIX, partisan conflict and global economic policy uncertainty indexes contribute in a non-
linear manner to the price formation process in commodity markets. The transmission of 
rumours into price may also be monetary policy or business cycle dependent, in which case an 
investigation in line with the aforementioned literature could prove productive. Another avenue 
for further research would involve the investigation of the credibility of rumour broadcasters 
over time. The results could provide a novel metric for testing the long-term efficiency of 
markets under the adaptive market hypothesis.  
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Appendix 
List of ‘ECB sources’ stories quoted by more than 50 Twitter accounts.  
Timestamp ECB Rumour Quote  
01/10/2013 1320 ECB Sources: New LTRO may not yield benefit if launched now 
22/10/2013 1433 ECB Sources: ECB to impose 8% capital buffer on Eurozone banks  
25/10/2013 1115 ECB Sources: Governing council hesitant over negative rates 
29/10/2013 1423 ECB Sources: No realistic prospect of refinancing or deposit rate cut 
06/11/2013 1449 ECB Sources: Rate change unlikely. LTRO not on top of the communication agenda 
07/11/2013 1605 ECB Sources: Weidmann opposed to today's rate cut 
11/11/2013 1047 ECB Sources: Considering package of stimulus for December meeting  
20/11/2013 1514 ECB Sources: Governing council considering negative deposited rate of 0.1% 
26/11/2013 1449 ECB Sources: 25 basis point rate cut and negative repo rate discussed  
06/01/2014 1530 ECB Sources: No major policy change expected in January  
28/01/2014 1139 ECB Sources: Governing council content with current monetary policy stance  
04/02/2014 0649 ECB Sources: Draghi looking closer at ending SMP sterilization  
05/02/2014 0953 ECB Sources: No consensus among governing council members on action tomorrow  
26/02/2014 0910 ECB Sources: No consensus among governing council members for March policy move  
13/03/2014 1423 ECB Sources: ECB and Treasury building emptied under security concern 
19/03/2014 1039 ECB Sources: Spanish banks face property reviews for ECB check-up 
02/04/2014 0909 ECB Sources: Markets over-interpreting possibility of QE. No consensus but intense 
debate 
24/04/2014 1141 ECB Sources: No consensus among governing council members for May policy action 
13/05/2014 1104 ECB Sources: Bundesbank sources say Bubba willing to accept significant stimulus  
14/05/2014 0827 ECB Sources: Preparing package of measures, including cuts to all 3 rates for June 
meeting  
20/05/2014 1102 ECB Sources: Considering 6-week meeting schedule to help write minutes, take policy 
decisions  
02/06/2014 1651 ECB Sources: ECB to lead revamp of global FX code of conduct  
04/06/2014 0641 ECB Sources: Draghi is likely to signal rate cut this week, won't necessarily be the last  
16/06/2014 1341 ECB Sources: Governing council likely to refrain from new measures for next few months  
26/06/2014 1434 ECB Sources: Governing council may not have reached lower bound on key rate 
22/07/2014 1251 ECB Sources: June rate cut affecting markets exactly the way Governing council want 
27/08/2014 1510 ECB Sources: New ECB action next week is unlikely  
28/08/2014 0010 ECB Sources: ECB policy action unlikely without inflation slump 
29/08/2014 1127 ECB Sources: No consensus among governing council members on QE next week 
04/09/2014 1137 ECB Sources: G.C. discussing ABS purchases worth up to €500 billion which could start 
this year 
08/09/2014 0757 ECB Sources: Policy measures could amount to €500 billion 
21/10/2014 1025 ECB Sources: ECB buying Spanish short-dated covered bonds 
27/10/2014 1231 ECB Sources: ECB cites barriers to QE. Need to let old measures work 
27/10/2014 1451 ECB Sources: Current stimulus may lack desired scale. QE an option 
31/10/2014 1512 ECB Sources: Existential threat to Euro if fiscal policy reform is not tackled 
03/11/2014 1023 ECB Sources: ECB considering improvement to LTRO if economy deteriorates, too early 
to say 
04/11/2014 1513 ECB Sources: Central bankers to challenge Draghi on leadership style 
06/11/2014 1055 ECB Sources: Governing council members did NOT confront Draghi at council dinner 
14/11/2014 1534 ECB Sources: Said to allow 24 hours to make smaller ABS purchases  
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26/11/2014 1249 ECB Sources: Governing council prefer additional time to assess current measures 
04/12/2014 1633 ECB Sources: German ECB members opposed to new balance sheet language 
19/12/2014 1012 ECB Sources: Considering making weaker Eurozone countries bear greater risk burden in 
QE plan  
06/01/2015 0639 ECB Sources: ECB is working on a discussion paper to execute government bond buying.  
09/01/2015 0951 ECB Sources: €500 billion plan showed to Governing Council members but no decision 
made 
09/01/2015 1114 ECB Sources: ECB considering risk sharing mix for QE plan  
16/01/2015 1640 ECB Sources: QE timing, size and scope yet to be decided 
19/01/2015 1445 ECB Sources: Bundesbank still striving to put limits on ECB QE 
21/01/2015 1430 ECB Sources: QE proposal calls for roughly €50 billion in bond buying per month  
03/02/2015 0957 ECB Sources: 3 Greek banks have tapped ECB ELA window 
03/02/2015 1420 ECB Sources: ECB won't accept Greek bond swap and wants full repayment 
04/02/2015 1927 ECB Sources: ECB believes Greece may run out of cash as early as March  
05/02/2015 1347 ECB Sources: ECB to allow Greek banks ELA up to €60 billion 
10/02/2015 1202 ECB Sources: ECB to accept Greek bonds as collateral if deal is reached  
17/02/2015 1645 ECB Sources: ECB member resisting support from ECB for Greek banks 
18/02/2015 1642 ECB Sources: ECB divided over extra funds for Greek banks 
18/02/2015 2011 ECB Sources: Greek banks asked for €5 billion extra in ELA funding  
19/02/2015 0709 ECB Sources: ECB has extended ELA to Greek banks from €65 billion to €68.3 billion 
02/03/2015 1442 ECB Sources: Staff projections may show 2017 inflation target return, signal end to QE 
Sep 2016 
09/03/2015 0827 ECB Sources: ECB has started QE programme 
19/03/2015 0925 ECB Sources: ECB has approved additional €400 billion for Greek banks as emergency 
liquidity  
25/03/2015 1400 ECB Sources: ECB raising ELA for Greek banks to €71 billion 
01/04/2015 1921 ECB Sources: ECB raised emergency funding cap by €700 million for Greek banks 
17/04/2015 1914 ECB Sources: ECB examines possibility of I.O.U. currency in case of default 
 
 
 
